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Abstract. This paper adopts a Model Based Security (MBS) approach to 
identify security requirements during the early stages of multi-agent system 
development. Our adopted MBS approach is underpinned by a metamodel 
independent of any specific methodology. It allows for security considerations 
to be embedded within any situated agent methodology which then prescribes 
security considerations within its work products. Using a standard model-driven 
engineering (MDE) approach, these work products are initially constructed as 
high abstraction models and then transformed into more precise models until 
code-specific models can be produced. A multi-agent system case study is used 
to illustrate the applicability of the proposed security-aware metamodel. 
Keywords: Security-based Metamodelling, Model Based Security, Modelling 
of Secure Agent-Oriented Information Systems, Modelling of Security features, 
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1. Introduction 
In the context of conceptual modelling and model-driven software engineering, 
(software) agents can be defined as conceptual entities that exhibit autonomy, 
situatedness and interactivity. They are situated in an environment in which they are 
able to sense and respond to changes. Agents have been found useful in model-based 
development of open, distributed and heterogeneous systems. However, as has been 
argued in the literature [23], for agent technology to be widely recognized, the 
security issues that surround agents must be resolved.  
Research efforts, so far, have mainly focussed on  solving  individual security 
problems of multi-agent systems (MAS), such as attacks by an agent on another agent, 
attacks from a platform on an agent, and/or attacks from an agent on a platform [14]. 
Security is not yet considered as part of the development process of a MAS. This is 
partly because existing methodologies, modelling languages and methods for the 
development of MASs do not generally incorporate abstractions and processes that 
support the consideration of security issues.  Rather security is often considered only 
after the design of the system has been finalised, which leads to various security 
vulnerabilities [19].  
In this paper, we produce a methodology-independent security (meta) model that 
can be used in the construction of any situated methodology [7] as required by the 
context of the MAS development project. It is aligned with Model Based Security 
(MBS) as proposed in [16] as a means of supporting the consideration of security 
from the early stages of the information system development process. Initially, high 
abstraction models are constructed and transformed, following a standard model-
driven engineering (MDE) approach, into more precise models until code-specific 
models can be produced. We believe this approach, combining agents and security in 
an MDE context, can be successfully employed in the overall development of a multi-
agent software system. Towards this, this paper provides the foundations for the 
construction of the models in the form of an agent-oriented modelling language that 
incorporates security considerations.   
We present a MAS metamodel that defines security concepts along with agent 
development concepts. Our MAS metamodel described in this paper has the capacity 
to model the security requirements of any given MAS independently of the process 
used to create it. It is based on the FAML (FAME1 Agent-oriented Modelling 
Language) generic metamodel [1] and previous work on security-aware agent 
metamodels [2]. The chosen security concepts are designated into two sets: run-time 
concepts and design-time concepts. Each set has two scopes: system-related or agent 
internals-related scope. Our work is part of a greater effort to develop secure multi-
agent systems, based on the application of model-based security and a conceptual 
modelling approach to address security requirements of multi-agent systems, as 
suggested in recent work e.g. [10, 19]. This allows developers to account for security 
of a MAS early during the development of the system rather than as a costly 
afterthought.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes related work. 
Section 3 briefly outlines the FAML metamodel and the analytic process used to 
identify the required security modelling units (classes in the metamodel).  Section 4 
articulates the MAS-specific security concerns of any MAS and associates these with 
basic modelling primitives.  Section 5 incorporates these primitives into our 
metamodel and extends the metamodel to accommodate all security concerns 
identified in Section 4. Section 6 illustrates the semantics of the modelling units of our 
metamodel on a P2P community sharing application illustrating our model driven 
                                                          
1
 FAME (Framework for Agent-oriented Method Engineering) is the project name under which 
FAML has been developed. 
approach to develop a securitised MAS. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a 
discussion of future work. 
2. Modelling and Developing Secure Agent-Oriented Systems 
The term agent derives from the present particle of the Latin verb agere, which 
means to drive, act, lead or do [5]. Although there is no standard definition of what 
a software agent is, it is widely agreed that, in broad terms, an agent demonstrates 
the following properties: (i) Autonomy. Agents operate without the direct 
intervention of humans or others, and have some kind of control over their actions 
and internal state; (ii) Social ability. Agents interact with other agents (and possibly 
humans) via some kind of agent communication language; (iii) Reactivity. Agents 
perceive their environment, (which may be the physical world, such as a user via a 
graphical user interface, a collection of other agents, the Internet, or perhaps all of 
these combined), and respond in a timely fashion to changes that occur in it; (iv) 
Pro-activeness. Agents do not simply act in response to their environment; they are 
able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative.  
Work within the agent research community has led towards the development of 
agent-oriented software engineering (AOSE) paradigm. AOSE introduces an 
alternative approach in analysing and designing complex distributed computerised 
systems [13, 15, 36], according to which a complex computerised system is viewed 
as a  multi-agent system (MAS) [13] in which a collection of autonomous software 
agents (subsystems) interact with each other in order to satisfy their design 
objectives. Therefore, when developing a MAS, this can be viewed as a society, 
similar to a human society, consisting of entities that possess characteristics similar 
to humans such as mobility, intelligence and the capability of communicating [13]. 
To assist the development of multi-agent systems, a number of methodologies (see 
for instance Tropos, GAIA, MaSE) and their associated process-focused 
metamodels, as well as modelling languages (see for instance AgentUML, AML) 
have been proposed. In this paper, we focus on metamodels for the atomic 
paradigmatic element (here, agents) and its associated work products and do not 
discuss any further process- or method-focussed metamodels such as the OMG’s 
SPEM or the International Standard ISO/IEC 24744.    
Although security has been identified as an important issue [23] for the 
widespread use of agent technology, most of the methodologies and modelling 
languages either ignore the security aspects related to MAS development or only 
provide partial treatment of security concerns. We briefly review here the literature 
that considers the security issues for multi-agent systems.  
Liu et al. [18] identify security requirements during the development of multi-
agent systems, in which security requirements are analysed as relationships 
amongst strategic actors, such as users, stakeholders and potential attackers. These 
authors propose three different kinds of analysis techniques: agent-oriented, goal-
oriented and scenario-based analysis. Agent-oriented analysis is used to model 
potential threats and security measures, whereas goal-oriented analysis is employed 
for the development of a catalogue to support the identification of the different 
security relationships within the system. Finally, scenario-based analysis is 
considered as an elaboration of the other two kinds of analysis. 
Secure Tropos [21] is an extension to Tropos [6] and is the first methodology to 
consider security issues during the development of multi-agent systems, extending 
Tropos with security-related concepts and introducing a security-related process 
that allows developers to identify the security requirements of a multi-agent system, 
to transform these requirements into a design and to test the developed system 
against a number of potential security attacks [21]. Huget [12] proposed a new 
agent-oriented methodology, called Nemo, and claims it tackles security. From the 
current description of the methodology, security seems to be considered only 
superficially with security not considered as a specific model but included within 
the other models of the methodology.  The developer even states “security has to be 
intertwined more deeply within models” [12]. Therefore, more evidence is required 
to satisfy the developer’s claim that the methodology tackles security. 
To the best of our knowledge, there has been, to date, little or no effort to 
provide a model-based security approach for multi-agent systems. Although a 
number of works support the concept of model-based security for software systems 
(e.g. [16, 22]); these works do not adequately support the development of multi-
agent systems since they omit important agent-oriented concepts and abstractions.  
Hence, developers find no help when considering security during the development 
of MAS  and the common approach towards the inclusion of security within an 
agent-oriented system is to identify security requirements after the definition of a 
system [23]. This typically means that security enforcement mechanisms have to be 
retrofitted into a pre-existing design. This approach leads to serious design 
challenges that usually translate into the emergence of agent-based systems 
afflicted with security vulnerabilities [4, 23].  
Work has commenced on agent-oriented modelling languages that could support 
a model-based approach for the development of multi-agent systems. The Agent 
Unified Modelling Language (AUML) [25] is an extension of the well-known 
UML aiming to model agent systems. Its support for agent-oriented concepts is 
heterogeneous although there are some extensions that accommodate the distinctive 
characteristics of agent systems such as autonomy and mobility. However, AUML 
does not consider security issues.  
3. The FAME Agent-oriented Modelling Language 
Within the overall framework of the FAME (Framework for Agent-oriented 
Method Engineering) project, we have identified the need to include a modelling 
language. Such a modelling language defines concepts from which can be instantiated 
modelling elements from which a model (a design) can be constructed. The design can 
then be hand-coded or used as the input to model-based (or model-driven) information 
systems development, as in MDE (model-driven engineering) or a specific flavour of 
MDE like OMG’s Model-Driven Architecture (MDA) [17, 27]. This modelling 
language was developed as a generic approach by the study of a large number of 
specialized and highly focussed (sometimes linked to a single methodology) 
modelling suites, some of which included a metamodel description. The resulting 
FAML (FAME Modelling Language) is essentially a metamodel, depicted typically 
using UML [27, 28]. The 4-step, iterative research methodology we adopted to ensure 
quality and genericity of this model is detailed in [1] and the results summarized in 
this section. 
It was soon realized that a single interconnected metamodel would be unusable in 
practice and that, instead, we identified two dimensions along which a more rational 
metamodelling result could be portrayed. Firstly, in agent-oriented software 
modelling, there is a rough discrimination between design time and run time – in an 
MDE context this reflects to some extent the difference between the PIM (platform 
independent model) and the PSM (platform specific model) [26]. Secondly, there are 
two viewpoints that can be termed agent internal and system focussed. This leads to 
four distinct diagrammatic groupings (Fig. 1). These four definitional views, as 
published in [1] are shown in Figs. 2-5. 
**** Figs. 1-5 about here **** 
Fig. 2 shows the classes of the metamodel that are directly related to the description 
of design-time system-related classes. These are concerned with features that can only 
be perceived by looking at the whole system at design time. Fig. 3 shows the classes 
related to the environment in which agents “live”, that is, run-time environment-
related classes. Fig. 4 shows the classes related to the agent internals at design time 
and Fig. 5 shows the classes related to agent internals at run-time, classes that can only 
be perceived by considering the internals of agents at run-time. The ontological 
definitions for design-time and run-time concepts are given in Tables 1 and 2 
respectively. 
**** Table 1-2 about here **** 
The combination of these four diagrams, which is the FAML definition, was 
evaluated in [1] by comparison with TAO [33] and Islander [8]. However, none of 
these approaches (FAML, TAO, Islander) deal with security issues. Consequently, we 
have introduced security concerns into the existing FAML metamodel as described 
below. 
4. Security Requirements of a MAS  
In this section, we analyse the security requirement of multi agent systems to extend 
FAML to support modelling of security concerns. The extension of FAML consists of 
two sets of modelling classes (metaclasses): One set to model the security 
requirements of a multi-agent system (MAS) identified by the developer during the 
design stage; and another to model  security actions satisfying the security 
requirements. These modelling classes will be added to the four views of the FAML 
metamodel shown in Figs. 2-5 to produce the new version shown in Figs 6-9. Our 
security-aware MAS metamodel (Figs 6-9) enables developers to consider security 
vulnerabilities of individual agents at all stages in a model-driven development 
project. We argue that security requirements of a multi-agent system can be generally 
categorized into two types: System Security Requirements (SSRs) and Agent Specific 
Security Requirements (ASSRs). SSRs are used to model security requirements that 
apply to the system as a whole, i.e. that all the agents of the system must satisfy, whilst 
ASSRs are used to model security requirements that only apply to individual agents.    
The analysis in this section runs along two dimensions: the dimension of increasing 
complexity of security risk (see Section 4.1) and the dimension of inherent attributes 
of agents in a MAS. The latter dimension includes the agent inherent attributes: 
autonomy, mobility and cooperation (see Sections 4.2-4.3). Modelling unit sets 
associated with these attributes may overlap.  
4.1. Agent-specific vulnerability levels 
 The first dimension of analysis, the security context complexity, ranges from a 
single agent on a single machine to a fully mobile MAS with agents capable of 
roaming the net using dynamic multi-hop routing. Although a grey scale, we can 
characterize an agent that carries its code, data and its state of execution (i.e. program 
counter and CPU registers) as a strongly mobile agent and an agent that only carries 
code and data as being weakly mobile. We start our analysis in the least risky 
environment (a single agent on a single machine) although we aim to extend this later 
in order to overcome its limitations in increasingly risky settings until we have a 
complete security model that can represent all security requirements and solutions for 
the riskiest setting.  
In total, we identified five different levels of vulnerabilities as shown in Table 3. 
The agent vulnerability level and, consequently, the need for protection such as 
encryption, increases as we move from Level 0 to Level 4.  In the case of Level 2, data 
are transported (for message passing) while, for Levels 3 and 4, both data and code 
may be transported (for remote evaluation), thus allowing application level attacks. 
Level 4 is considered more vulnerable than Level 3 due to the additional complexity 
of the agent also carrying its state of execution (i.e. program counter and CPU 
registers). Within Levels 3 and 4, the mobility of the MAS is important. For instance 
the level of distribution may range from a single hop, to multiple fixed hops, to 
dynamic multiple hops. As the number of hops and the degree of freedom increases, it 
becomes more complex to ensure safe transportation when intermediate co-operation 
is not guaranteed (hostile hosts may be encountered – this is not the case for 
distributed systems). The scale of vulnerabilities, as shown in Table 3, delineates the 
research issues at each level of complexity and can be used as a research roadmap to 
fulfil MAS-specific security requirements of the most complex forms of MAS. 
 
**** Table 3 about here **** 
Agent security requirements for communication channels are equivalent to the 
normal requirements for confidentiality, integrity, authentication and availability 
required by a typical software application [4]. Security of communication channels is 
not included in the MAS-specific security requirements. Our security framework 
strives for authenticated communication between agents (including mobile agents), 
where any receiving agent can ascertain the identity of the sender and can choose to 
block an agent if it does not want to interact with it. Moreover, any agent can 
deny/offer access to its owned resources (including its internal state) at any time it 
wishes. Resources that need to be protected can be local (owned by a single agent) or 
global (owned by many agents), be distributed or reside on a single device.  
4.2. Co-operation, autonomy and security of agents 
A MAS can offer new services and functionality created from a combination of 
specialized services of individual agents. Typically, this requires co-operation 
between agents in order to make MASs adaptive and versatile when encountering 
unforeseen problems. It is therefore important to be able to maintain co-operation 
between agents by ensuring that interactions that exist between agents specifically in 
order to share resources are kept secure. Restricting access can hinder functionality 
and is not always a viable option. To simplify our analysis, in this section we assume 
that the agent’s resources are localized with the agent and that any resource is owned 
by only one agent.  
Co-operation between agents in a MAS requires mutual agreement between agents 
to share resources and, in some instances, to share access to their internal states [35]. 
The broader the mutually agreed access to resources and internal states is, the richer 
the potential functionality of the system. It is essential for agents to be able to trust 
other agents in order to provide a broad spectrum of interactions. In order to 
implement a mutual agreement to share access to resources and internal states between 
agents, i.e. to co-operate, it is critical for agents to discern changes in their states or 
resource arising both from a legitimate access and from changes arising from 
malicious intrusion. A way to achieve this is for each message to be uniquely 
associated with an agent identity and time-stamped. We include agent_identity as a 
basic modelling unit to describe an agent uniquely. This identity can be a function of 
the system to which an agent belongs; although in the case of open systems we note 
that this would not be important.  This serves as a fingerprint of any agent created in 
any MAS. A higher level security concept, signature, can be implemented using 
agent_identity. A signature should be known by trusted parties and producible by the 
relevant identity [32]. The extended metamodel will also describe the relation between 
agents and their resources through ownership and usage relationships.  
To maintain its autonomy, an agent should be resilient and able to recover from an 
interaction that gives access to unauthorized resources. In other words, maintaining 
some state description of its past interactions is required. Each agent should have an 
interaction_history log to allow for recovery. This log is only accessible to the agent. 
This concept along with ownership secures the internal state of agent. An agent within 
the system can then co-operate to reinstate its state as well as the state of the MAS if 
and when needed. Mediated systems e.g. [9] use a system interaction history, but this 
requires centralized access, which we avoid since it places limits on the mobility of 
agents. Our decentralized framework can model a mediated solution by having a 
single agent designated to mediate and to interact with all other agents. The 
interactions log of the ‘mediator-designate’ will then be a log of all interactions within 
the system, as in [9].   
4.3. Mobility and security of agents 
Mobility allows agents to replace remote procedure calls, saving on bandwidth and 
allowing computations not otherwise possible. In comparison with traditional 
distributed systems, mobility allows additional functionality for a MAS but also incurs 
additional security requirements. Mobility of agents varies, as noted in Table 3. For 
weakly mobile agents, discerning intrusion is easier, since the agent starts execution 
from scratch when it reaches its host. The essential problem with mobile agents is 
compounded by the fact that the host may require access to agent execution states 
[37]. Hence, if the host is malicious, intrusion recovery is needed.  
Assuming that an agent is transmitted safely along a channel, threats to the 
resources of an agent (mobile or non-mobile) come from interacting with, inter alia, 
other agents, the host or users themselves. For example, there may be one or more 
mobile malicious agents designed to steal or corrupt data in the environment of the 
agent under consideration; the host that controls its execution could mistake the 
identity of the agent or it may simply be a malicious luring host; or unauthorized users 
might attempt to corrupt or steal an agent’s data, or might attempt to infiltrate the 
functionality of the MAS. 
A mobile agent system will support several networking protocols, which will allow 
it to transmit itself over a network. This could expose an agent to additional sources of 
threat through interacting with less trusted sources, the extent of the vulnerability of a 
mobile agent depending on the freedom it has with respect to its mobility. Mobility 
can be single hop (from host to another without any intermediate hosts) versus 
multiple hop (one or many intermediate hosts) or fixed (travel path is fixed and 
statically decided) versus dynamic (path is decided by agent as it travels – it is said to 
be roaming). Mobility requires the location modelling unit so that an agent is able to 
reason about its movements. Combined with its interaction_history (history of hops as 
well for mobile agents), it can reinstate itself into a safer location if it is under attack.   
 In the next section, we integrate all modelling concepts identified in this section 
into the existing FAML metamodel (Figs. 2-5).  
5. Proposed Metamodel 
This section presents the new version of FAML which accounts for security 
requirements. The new security concepts added to FAML are first presented (Table 4). 
As these concepts are added, some existing FAML concepts are changed and some 
new non-security concepts are added (Table 5). The new ‘securitised’ FAML is 
presented in Figs. 6-9 
As noted in the previous section, MAS-specific security requirements are of two 
kinds. The first kind refers to general security requirements that are not specific to one 
particular agent in the system. These requirements need to be accommodated by all 
agents. The second kind impacts individual agents within the system in different ways 
as mandated by the application. In Section 4, the focus was on the first kind and, more 
specifically, those that are engendered by the inherent characteristics of agents and 
MASs. This has resulted in the identification of a set of new modelling units to be 
integrated into the FAML metamodel. These are shown in Table 4 while their 
associations and attributes are shown in Figs. 6-9. As in the original FAML, we 
continue to differentiate between security requirements that are modelled by the 
software developer during the design stage and security actions that are performed by 
the multi-agent system during run-time in order to satisfy the security requirements. 
This allows for the development of a security-aware platform-independent design, 
providing part of a PIM for MDA. The realization of a working security-aware multi-
agent system for a specific platform generated from a FAML instantiated MAS 
development methodology provides further support for a MDE development 
approach. 
 
*** Table 4 here  
At the system level, at design time, we view security requirements as part of the 
early design specification of the system. To support this, we introduce into the FAML 
metamodel the concept of security requirement, which we define as a security-related 
desirable property of the MAS that constrains its functional requirement(s). We 
distinguish between two classes of security requirements. Firstly, we identify system 
security requirements that relate to the integrity of the whole MAS. In other words, 
these are security requirements that must be fulfilled by all the agents of the system 
either individually by each agent of the system or through agent co-operation.  We call 
these System Security Requirements and it is this aspect that has been our focus in this 
paper. We also add Agent-specific Security Requirements to denote security 
requirements that apply to an individual agent. Such security requirements, which are 
usually complementary to the system security requirements, define security-related 
properties that individual agents have to satisfy. Usually, in every multi-agent system 
there is an analogy/balance between system-specific and agent-specific security 
requirements. A high number of system security requirements imply a low number of 
agent-specific security requirements and vice versa.  
A number of classes related to security and mobility were introduced into the 
metamodel. This resulted in a number of modifications in a number of classes of the 
original FAML metamodel. The modified or new (non-security) concepts are shown in 
Table 5 which provides a definition of new FAML and redefined classes. Associations 
and attributes of these concepts are shown in Figs. 6-9. For example, the new 
definition of the AgentDefinition now includes two new attributes (AgentIdentity and 
AgentType) and two more associations (Has and IsImposed) (see Fig. 8)..  
 
*** Table 5 here *** 
 
The extended FAML metamodel, including new concepts in Tables 4-5, is shown 
in four diagrams (Figs. 6-9) depicting the integration of security modelling units 
within the existing views: design-time system-related, runtime system-related 
(environment), design-time agent-internals and runtime agent-internals.  
**** Fig. 6 about here **** 
In FAML, the security framework is underpinned by recognizing and modelling the 
status of access to resources during development. The security requirements are 
modelled as a specialization of the Non-Functional Requirements. The security 
requirements are further specialized into system-specific security requirements (SSRs) 
and agent-specific security requirements (ASSRs) (see also Section 4). These security 
requirements add additional security goals and security tasks to the system goals and 
system tasks respectively (Fig. 6). To effectively implement its security requirement, 
we propose that a MAS views part of its resources as private, in order to protect and 
share only reservedly, and public in order to share more freely. Thus, in the proposed 
security extension, the modelling units Private Resource and Public Resource are 
added (Fig. 7). Private resources are agent-specific e.g. an agent’s history log of hops 
as well as interactions with other mobile agents (Interaction_History).   
**** Fig.  7 about here **** 
In the agent definition-level at run-time, each agent assumes responsibility for its 
security. This is modelled with Recover Action Specification (Fig. 8).  An example 
recovery action may be what the agent does to use the interaction log in order to 
reinstate its state and perhaps to assist in the reinstating of the MAS if an interaction 
has incorrectly given access to resources. This is a refinement of a more general 
modelling unit, Security Action Specification.  FAML is extended with modelling 
units to express mobility behaviour of agents with the metaclasses Relocate Action 
Specification and Location Specification. Relocating is a restricted action that requires 
access to secured resources of the agents (i.e. only the agent can relocate itself). 
**** Fig. 8 about here **** 
At runtime, central to agent security is authentication, together with recovery for 
when authentication fails. Therefore at the agent-runtime scope (shown in Fig. 9), 
FAML is extended with the metamodel classes that represent the various kinds of 
resources and their access (the same as agent-design time taxonomy of resources). In 
addition, it is extended to permit modelling of restricted actions. 
**** Fig. 9 about here **** 
As derived from the above discussion, the language does not differentiate between 
different types of requirements and/or security solutions. Neither differentiates the 
source of the requirements. This means that security requirements identified through 
security policies and security requirements identified through other means (for cases 
where a security policy is not present) are effectively treated the same. If there are 
specific security policies, then the rules of the policies (depending on their type) 
initially are modelled with the aid of the design model (environment) as either system-
wide or agent specific security requirements. Then, by employing the agent model 
(design), security constraints are derived. This process mainly depends on the 
methodology employed. For example, in secure Tropos security constraints model 
security requirements so the mapping is straightforward. Then, on the run time 
models, security actions are defined to represent possible security solutions for the 
identified security requirements. For instance, if the security policy of an organisation 
defines system-wide authorisation-related rules, these will be initially modelled as 
security requirements; security constraints will then be identified that enforce these 
requirements and security actions will be derived that provide security solutions that 
meet such security constraints and therefore the security requirements. 
6. Illustration of the Metamodel on a MAS Application 
As a practical illustration of security concepts in FAML, we consider a community-
based search MAS application that we designed in [34]. This is a very complex 
application that involves most concepts of FAML. However, we will only give 
examples of the security-related concepts. We first describe the application and then 
show how FAML assists in identifying and modelling security issues. 
6.1 P2P MAS application 
Syntax-based search engines produce a very large number of hits most of which are 
irrelevant. They also overlook relevant webpages. Community-based search engines 
offer a promising alternative. The search engine keeps a decentralized track of users’ 
common interests and history of queries to produce more accurate search results. Each 
human user is represented by an agent in the computer network to act on his/her 
behalf. This agent locates files and responds to queries from other similar agents. The 
collection of all these agents together with agents assisting them in their tasks form the 
P2P community-based-searching MAS. An agent representing the human user has 
access to a knowledge base containing electronic files that the user is willing to share 
with other users. Each file is identified by its title and type (e.g. HTML, pdf, music or 
video). As agents interact on behalf of their users, communities of interest begin to 
emerge. Agents develop an awareness of the communities to which users belong and 
use this awareness to fulfil their users’ search requests efficiently and effectively, by 
interacting with the agents in the communities most likely to be able to serve their 
requests. 
As human users pose a query to request files, the P2P MAS locates sites of other 
users where files matching the queries may reside, based on the querying behaviour of 
the users at those sites. The system mediates between human users, who are 
continuously represented by their local agents. An agent of another like-minded user 
may choose to respond to a query by providing details about the files it can supply, or 
by refusing the query. When all responses are received by the agent making the query, 
the agent combines and refines the results to compose a list of candidate files that 
satisfy the query. This is akin to a response from a web search engine but is shorter 
and more directly related to the query. The agent initiating the query can then select 
which file(s) it wants to download to its human user and it initiates a file transfer 
process with the agent who controls access to that file. Following a successful transfer, 
the knowledge base located where a particular query was made is updated to contain 
the received file(s) and to reflect the source of the file. For all agents involved in 
processing that query, their knowledge base is also updated with additional 
information reflecting the interests of the agent that initiated the query and further 
information about interests of other agents involved in the response. This information 
is used in future queries. In other words, as agents interact, they develop awareness of 
both the files possessed by their peers and which peers may be interested in the files 
that they themselves have.  
At each node in the network, each user-agent keeps a record of its history of 
information sharing. The history contains two records: one of the past queries that it 
made on behalf of the human user and its respective responders, and one of the past 
queries received and their respective agent senders (acting on behalf of other human 
users). The former needs to be updated every time the user-agent receives a results list 
from the system, while the latter requires updating every time the user-agent replies to 
a query sent by the system. The history is used to produce short lists of candidate 
nodes for future queries, by calculating the similarity between the current query and a 
past query e.g. as suggested in [20]. If no nodes can be short-listed, or if no candidate 
user-agents provide the required service, the agent-user broadcasts the query to a 
wider circle of user-agents in the community to identify new candidate providers. In a 
fully evolved P2P system, agents may use their knowledge about other users’ interests 
to request/negotiate for information from their peers when they do not know who has 
the files of interest. Any new providers are eventually added to the history, thereby 
expanding the user-agent’s contact circle. The strategy of information sharing can be 
applied to any domain. The system is tuned to a domain using an external ontology 
describing the domain [3]. A fully deployed P2P community-based search system 
would have access to a suite of ontologies corresponding to various domains. As users 
use various ontologies to express their search, communities emerge. Details of how a 
community emerges or connects to another community (using a global ontology) are 
omitted here as they are not relevant for our description of security-related concepts. 
6.2 FAML security concept examples in the P2P MAS application 
In what follows, we illustrate the security aspects of FAML using the P2P 
application. FAML guides the identification of the P2P MAS security requirements. 
Accordingly, FAML’s structure determines how they are identified and addressed 
according to its four views (shown in Figure 1): design-time system-related, runtime 
system-related (environment), design-time agent-internals and runtime agent-internals 
views. We first propose a set of the design-time system-related security concepts 
(Figure 6). For each subsequent view (Figures 7, 8 and 9), we give example concepts 
refining the design-time security concepts. 
6.2.1. Design-time system concerns in the P2P application 
Security requirements can either be System Security Requirements or Agent 
Specific Requirements (see Figure 6). From the application description, we identify 
Agent Specific Security Requirements (ASSR): 
1. An agent guards the history of queries it receives and sends. 
2. An agent is able to guard its own identity. 
3. An agent can prove its own identity. 
4. An agent guards the identity of communities to which it belongs. 
5. An agent guards resources (files) it owns for the purpose of sharing. 
6. If an agent is a community gate keeper, it guards the membership to the 
community. 
 
The above six requirements suggest the following System Security Requirements  
(SSR) of the P2P community-based searching system.  
On the receiver side: 
7.  A sender agent’s identity is authenticated before processing a search request. 
8. A file is accepted from identified and authenticated senders who confirm and 
authenticate their identity at the start and at the conclusion of a transfer.  
9. A sender agent’s identity is confirmed before responding to a history query. 
On the sender side: 
10. Every search query sent is authenticated. 
11. A file is transferred to identified and authenticated receivers who confirm 
and authenticate their identity at the start and at the end of a successful transfer.  
12. Every history query that is sent is authenticated. 
 
Requirements 7, 8 and 9 on the receiver side are equivalent to requirements 10, 11 and 
12 on the sender side respectively.  
 
The preceding 12 Security Requirements satisfy the following Security Goals (Figure 
6) which we identify as follows: 
1. An agent shares a file only when an explicit request is made by a known 
trusted agent or a member a known community. This goal satisfies 
requirements 8 and 11.  
2. An agent shares data from its interaction history only when an explicit 
request is made by a known trusted peer or a member of a known community. 
This goal satisfies requirement 1. 
3. An agent is the sole entity with access to its interaction history. This goal 
satisfies requirements 9, 12 and 1. 
4. An agent is the sole entity that can search its files. This goal satisfies 
requirements 7, 10 and 5. 
5. An agent has a unique identity identifier that can be securely transmitted to 
other agents if the agent decides to do so. This identifier can be changed only 
by the agent. This goal satisfies requirements 2 and 3. 
6. An agent keeps track of communities to which it belongs. This goal satisfies 
requirement 4. 
7. An agent can make an authentic request to community gate keepers regarding 
peer memberships. This goal satisfies requirement 4. 
8. An agent can make an authentic request to community gate keepers to join a 
given community. This goal satisfies requirement 6. 
 
As shown in Figure 6, according to FAML, Security Goals are achieved by Security 
Tasks. The above 8 security goals are achieved by one or more of the following 
Tasks:  
1. Confirm an agent’s identity against known peers. 
2. Confirm an agent’s community membership. 
3. Maintain a list of community memberships. 
4. Retrieve historical data. 
5. Update interaction history. 
6. Transmit own identity. 
7. Request to become member of a community. 
8. Nominate to become a community gate keeper. 
9. Request identity of community gate keeper. 
10. Broadcast new members to corresponding communities (by gate keeper). 
 
The preceding 12 security requirements, 8 security goals and 10 security tasks form 
the set of system-related security classes at design time. In the rest of this section, we 
show examples of the security-related concepts for the remaining three views of the 
securitised FAML (as illustrated in Figures 7, 8 and 9). 
 
 6.2.2. Run-time environment concerns in the P2P application 
Agent specific Security Requirements define Security Constraints at the environment 
level view (agent-external, runtime) shown in Figure 7. For example, consider Agent 
Specific Security Requirements 1, that an “agent guards the history of queries it 
receives and sends”. This Agent Specific Requirement gives rise to the following 
Security Constraints: 
• Queries involving private resources are authenticated. 
• Community membership is known and shared. 
The Environment-level view (agent-external, runtime) shown in Figure 7 indicates 
that Security Tasks have Security Action Specifications. For example, security Task 2 
suggests the following Security Action Specification:  
• Check a given identity against a known list of identities of agents. If the 
check is successful then perform a history query.  
Another example of Security Action Specification is shown in Section 6.3.  
An example of Private Resource Specification (in Figure 7) is:   
• History of queries is a private resource specified as a database design storing 
all information about past queries. Every agent has such a database that it 
uses to guide its search queries and it shares this database with other trusted 
agents. 
6.2.3. Agent internal scope in the P2P application 
Examples of an Agent Private Resource in the FAML view of agent internals at design 
time (Figure 8) include:  
• History of queries. 
• History of agents contacted and details of contact. 
• Files to be shared. 
These Private Resources are used by an agent in the FAML view of agent-internals at 
runtime (Figure 9).  
Other examples in the FAML view of agent internals at design time are: 
• Recover Action at runtime is derived from the execution of the recovery 
action depending on the prevailing environment conditions applicable. For 
example the recovery in the case of a failed identity check (described in 
Action Specification 1 shown in Section 6.2.2) is different from the recovery 
in the case of failed file transfer (shown in Section 6.3).   
• Location Specification: For example host locality and communities’ 
membership details. 
6.3. P2P application case study discussion 
In our FAML-driven security analysis in Section 6.2, if a concept appears in more 
than one view, we gave examples of the first occurrence. Whilst we have presented the 
case study in a top-down fashion (from system-related security model units at design 
time to agent model units at runtime), it is important to note that this may not capture 
all the security-related components because there are non-security Tasks (at the 
system level view) that may involve Security Actions at the agent level view. For 
example if a file transfer is interrupted, the following more elaborate example of a 
Security Action Specification applies:  
• Recovery from wrongly authenticated file transfer: 
o If transfer is not complete, abort file transfer and undertake a minor 
clean-up operation of partially transferred data. 
o If transfer is already finished, undertake a major clean-up operation of 
file, checking for any malicious code included in the file and in any other 
file involving any agents in the security breach. 
o Trace any side-effects including any pending requests, any modifications 
required to history, any modifications to security knowledge base. 
o Check for any past bad file from same source. 
  
Within the same view, a non-security Task may also require an agent specific 
requirement. For example, at the System level view, community portal agents are 
appointed based on a request they make and confirmation by sufficient number of peer 
agents. The data stored in the history of interactions will form the basis of an agent 
volunteering and the subsequent peer confirmations. This is not security-related 
requirement, however, since it does involve security-related Tasks because an agent 
needs to make an authentic request to peers it has interacted with in order to form a 
community. 
  When the full model has been derived by analysis of all 20 security requirements in 
this P2P case study, and the independent analysis and verification of all security 
modelling units (at the other views in FAML) have been undertaken, the resultant 
model then forms the input to the model-based software development project. Since 
each element in the security-based agent model/design is conformant to an element in 
the MAS metamodel, it is defined unambiguously and precisely. Thus such a security-
based design is an ideal input to an MDE style of application development (a 
description of the basic ideas underlying MDE can be found in e.g. [17]). 
7. Discussion, Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper, we have presented work that provides the foundation towards a 
model-based security approach for the development of secure multi-agent systems. In 
particular, we have extended the FAME Modelling Language (FAML) and we have 
defined a metamodel that supports the development of security models for agent-
oriented systems. The original FAML metamodel [1] did not accommodate the 
security requirements of the system nor allow description of security solutions such as 
the ones discussed in this paper. The security extensions to FAML described in this 
paper will allow software developers to describe security solutions and produce 
secured work products as the system is developed.   
Our extensions maintain FAML’s methodology-independence in the sense that it 
can be used to document work products (e.g. designs) created from any one of the 
“branded” agent-oriented methodologies, such as Prometheus [29], or those created as 
part of a situational method engineered from method fragments, as in the agent 
extensions to the OPEN Process Framework (see e.g. [11]). In both cases, the work 
products documented using the proposed FAML extensions for security are amenable 
to act as input to a method-driven engineering lifecycle from which, after appropriate 
rule-based transformations, code can be generated [30]. 
In extending our work with FAML to represent secured MAS work products, we 
preserve the original structure of a 2x2 matrix (Fig. 1) covering the various 
perspectives of the work products involved in developing a MAS. In our security-
enhanced framework, managing the MAS-specific security requirements is 
decentralized and is relegated to the individual agents forming the system.  In theory, 
all the security requirements of a multi-agent system fall into one of two categories, 
i.e. either system-wide security requirements (SSRs) or agent-specific security 
requirements (ASSRs). Therefore, although the metamodel does not provide specific 
units corresponding to specific security requirements/solutions, such as authorisation 
or authentication, it does provide developers with the basic units that can be used to 
model even complex security requirements/solutions. The definition of a metamodel 
that provides specific units for security requirements/solutions would be almost 
impossible and certainly impractical – impossible since an inevitable limitation would 
be to prove in a concrete way that the abstracted notions in the metamodel are 
sufficient for modelling all possible security requirements arising from MAS 
applications (similar to the impossibility of proving that an information system is 
100% secure); and impractical since it would not allow adaptation to different 
methodologies, thus restricting the developer.  Our security modelling framework is 
decentralised and more general than mediated security solutions such as [31].  It is 
also different from the works of [12, 16, 18, 21, 22], discussed in Section 2, in that we 
focus on the simultaneous treatment of three important properties of a software agent: 
autonomy, mobility and co-operation. Although these properties are important for 
many agent systems, particularly those in situations where security is paramount, the 
above approaches do not consider all of them. For instance, the work by Liu et al., and 
Mouratidis et al., fail to consider mobility whereas Nemo neglects mobility and 
autonomy. 
Work more related to our suggested approach is that of Mouratidis et al. [24] on 
the definition of an architectural description language (ADL) to specify secure multi-
agent systems. In that work, a set of design primitives is proposed and conceptualized 
using the Z specification language to capture a "core" architectural model to build 
secure MAS architectures. However, there are two important differences with our 
approach. First of all, the approach of [24] does not consider mobility and, secondly, 
as stated by the authors of that work, it lacks a suitable set of core abstractions, 
inspired by organizational metaphors, to be used during the design of the secure multi-
agent system architecture. Therefore, we believe that our work complements that work 
by providing that missing set of core abstractions. Finally, our work is also distinct in 
that it is methodology-independent in the same way that in the object-oriented world, 
the use of UML [28] for documenting work products is not restricted to any specific 
methodology. It can be used to enhance the work products of any MAS methodology. 
It is a necessary step towards using Model Based Security for multi-agent system 
development. 
On the other hand, our work is not complete and there are still a few outstanding 
questions that are raised by the introduction of additional agent-related attributes such 
as ownership, e.g. can agents themselves be owned?, and advanced agent mobility, 
such as dynamic routing. Further work is required to complete our set of security 
modelling units taking into account these additional agent attributes. 
We have begun an initial verification of this security-enhanced metamodel of 
FAML by applying it to the analysis of security requirements of a community-based 
peer-to-peer web search engine. This verification will be developed further to fulfil 
the highest levels of complexity in security requirements taking into account roaming 
agents and their dynamic routing requirements. This further verification will likely 
overlap with additional development of the security-enhanced metamodel described 
here. Our future work will also link the development of secure MASs and their related 
access policies with risk management standards (e.g. ISO17799, ISO7498/2) as 
applied at an organizational level. This would guide MAS developers in making 
inevitable trade-off decisions of security versus cost and functionality. Authentication, 
intrusion detection and recovery require more computation and storage of relevant 
features of the involved interactions and resources by each agent. Diverting too many 
resources (e.g. storage, computation) towards security may indirectly limit the 
functionality of the system. Investing in reducing security has a point of diminishing 
returns, most of the benefits being reaped with the first chunk of the cost. When a 
MAS and its agents are modelled with our decentralised security features, it will be 
possible for security managers, using appropriate security policies, to achieve an 
optimum balance between functionality and security and to ensure that such systems 
are capable of protecting themselves and capable of authenticating both their 
incoming and outgoing interactions. In future work, we will guide developers in 
tackling such complex trade-off decisions.  
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Figures 
 
Fig. 1.  The 2x2 matrix that is used to define four typical FAML metalevel diagrams 
Fig. 2. System-related design-time classes. [The diamond notation indicates a generic whole-
part relationship] (after [1]) 
Fig. 3. Run-time, environment-related classes (after [1]) 
Fig. 4. Agent-internals design-time classes (after [1]) 
Fig. 5.  Agent-internals run-time classes (after [1]) 
Fig. 6.  System-level (agent-external, design-time) classes. (Note that the duplication of the 
Role class is only to simplify the layout) (updated from [2]) 
Fig. 7.  Environment-level (agent-external, runtime) classes (updated from [2]) 
Fig. 8.  Agent definition-level (agent-internal, design-time) classes (updated from [2]) 
Fig. 9.  Agent-level classes (agent-internal, runtime) (updated from [2]) 
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Fig. 2. FAML original System-related design-time classes. The diamond notation indicates a generic 
whole-part relationship (after [1]). The concept Role is repeated for layout convenience.  
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Fig. 3. FAML original run-time, environment-related classes (after [1]) 
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Fig. 4. FAML original agent-internals design-time classes (after [1]) 
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Fig. 5. FAML original agent-internals run-time classes (after [1]). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. System-level (agent-external, design-time) classes: (updated from [2]) This diagram shows the 
addition of (System) Goals and Organisation Definition (cf.h Fig. 2). More importantly, it shows the 
inclusion of Security Requirement and its refinement into corresponding security goals and tasks. 
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Fig. 7. Environment-level (agent-external, runtime) classes (updated from [2]): This diagram shows the 
global security concerns at  runtime, including the resources involved and the security constraints. 
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Fig. 8. Agent definition-level (agent-internal, design-time) classes (updated from [2]): This diagram shows 
how system security tasks are refined into various types of specific security actions associated within 
individual agents of the system. 
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Fig. 9. Agent-level classes (agent-internal, runtime) (updated from [2]). Agents action specification 
(from Figure 8) generate the actual actions at run-time. These include security actions which are activated 
due to run-time events. 
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Table 1. Design-time concepts and their definitions (after [1]) 
Term Definition 
Action Specification Specification of an action, including any preconditions and 
postconditions. 
Agent Definition Specification of the initial state of an agent just after it is created. 
Convention Rule that specifies an arrangement of events expected to occur in a 
given environment. 
Environment 
Statement 
A statement about the environment. 
Facet Action 
Specification 
Specification of a facet action in terms of the facet definition it will 
change and the new value it will write to the facet. 
Facet Definition Specification of the structure of a given facet, including its name, data 
type and access mode. 
Functional 
Requirement 
Requirement that provides added value to the users of the system. 
Message Action 
Specification 
Specification of a message action in terms of the message schema and 
parameters to use. 
Message Schema Specification of the structure and semantics of a given kind of 
messages that can occur within the system. 
Non-Functional 
Requirement 
Requirement about any limits, constraints or impositions on the system 
to be built. 
Ontology Structural model of the application domain of a given system. 
Ontology Aggregation Whole/part relationship between two ontology concepts. 
Ontology Concept Concept included in a given ontology. 
Ontology Relationship Relationship between ontology concepts. 
Ontology 
Specialisation 
Supertype/subtype relationship between two or more ontology 
concepts. 
Performance Measure Mechanism to measure how successful the system is at any point in 
time. 
Plan Specification An organised collection of action specifications. 
Requirement Feature that a system must implement. 
Role Specification of a behavioural pattern expected from some agents in a 
given system. 
System Final product of a software development project. 
Task Specification of a piece of behaviour that the system can perform. 
 
 Table 2. Run-time concepts and their definitions(after [1]) 
Term Definition 
Action Fundamental unit of agent behaviour. 
Agent A highly autonomous, situated, directed and rational entity. 
Belief An environment statement held by an agent and deemed as true in a 
certain timeframe. 
Desire An environment statement held by an agent, which represents a state 
deemed as good in a certain timeframe. 
Environment The world in which an agent is situated. 
Environment History The sequence of events that have occurred between the environment 
start-up and the present instant. 
Environment 
Statement 
A statement about the environment. 
Event Occurrence of something that changes the environment history. 
Facet Scalar property of the environment that is expected by the agents 
contained in it. 
Facet Action Action that results in the change of a given facet. 
Facet Event Event that happens when the value of a facet changes. 
Goal Ultimate desire. 
Intention A committed desire. 
Message Unit of communication between agents, which conforms to a specific 
message schema. 
Message Action Action that results in a message being sent. 
Message Event Event that happens when a message is sent. 
Obligation Behaviour expected from an agent at some future time. 
Plan An organised collection of actions. 
 
Table 3. Context Complexity of MAS 
Vulnerability level Description of Context Complexity Level 
0 A single agent system on a single machine.  
1 MAS running on a single machine– controlling access to 
agents’ resources during co-operation   
2 Distributed MAS (same as MAS if communication is secured) 
3 Weakly mobile agents  
4 Strongly mobile agents  
 
Table 4.  The set of identified security modelling units 
 
Security Term Definition 
Agent Specific  
Security Requirement 
(design-time) 
A security requirement that is true only for a specific agent of the 
system. This is a subclass of Security Requirement.  
DetectAction (run-
time) 
A detect action is an action that results in an agent initiating a 
detection procedure aiming to detect potential security breaches. 
This is a  subclass of SecurityAction. 
DetectAction 
Specification 
(design-time) 
A detect action specification is a specification of an action that an 
agent can take to detect a possible security incident, such as a 
security attack. This is a subclass of SecurityActionSpecification. 
PreventAction (run-
time) 
A prevent action is an action that results in an agent initiating a 
prevention procedure aiming to prevent potential security breaches. 
This is a subclass of SecurityAction. 
PreventAction 
Specification (design-
time) 
A prevent action specification is a specification of an action that an 
agent can take to prevent a security incident, such as a security attack. 
This is a subclass of SecurityActionSpecification. 
RecoverAction (run-
time) 
A recover action is an action that results in an agent initiating a 
recovery procedure after a security incident. This is a ubclass of 
SecurityAction.  
RecoverAction 
Specification (design-
time) 
A recover action specification is a specification of an action that an 
agent can take to recover from a security-related incident. This is a 
subclass of SecurityActionSpecification. 
Security Action (run-
time) 
A security action is an action that results in a security-related action 
been taken. This is a subclass of Action. 
Security Action 
Specification (design-
time) 
A security action specification is a specification of the security action 
in terms of the security action type to use. This is a subclass of 
ActionSpecification.  
Security Constraint 
(design-time) 
A security constraint is a statement (expressed in a logical or informal 
way) used to precisely define the restrictions imposed on an agent 
due to security requirements.  
Security Goal 
(design-time) 
A security goal is a specification of a security-related state that the 
system/agent tries to achieve. This is a sub-class of SystemGoal. 
Security 
KnowledgeBase (run-
time) 
A security knowledge base represents the security knowledge that an 
agent needs to be able to perform security-related actions.   
Security Requirement 
(design-time) 
A security requirement is a desirable security-related requirement that 
the system/agent must demonstrate. This is a subclass of Non-
Functional Requirement. 
Security Task 
(design-time) 
A security task is a specification of a piece of security behaviour that 
a system and/or an agent can perform. This is a subclass of 
SystemTask. 
System Security 
 Requirement 
(design-time) 
A system security requirement is a security requirement that is true 
for all the agents of the multi-agent system. This is a subclass of 
Security Requirement. 
 
Table 5. FAML modified or new concepts, accommodating new security concepts (shown in Table 4). Old 
concepts that are modified are shown in italics, the rest are new concepts. 
Non-Security Term 
 Modified 
Definition 
AgentDefinition (design-time) An agent specification is a specification of the initial state of 
an agent just after it is created. It has three attributes: 
InitialState, AgentIdentity and AgentType (e.g. mobile 
versus static)  
Goal (design-time) A goal is a specification of a state of the environment that 
the system tries to achieve. This is a subclass of 
EnvironmentStatement. 
Location (run-time) Location provides information about places where an agent 
can reside within the system. 
LocationSpecification (design-
time) 
Location specification is information about places where an 
agent can reside within the system. 
NonFunctionalRequirement 
(design-time) 
A non-functional requirement is a requirement about any 
limits, constraints or impositions on the system to be built. 
This is a subclass of Requirement. 
ResourceSpecification 
(design-time) 
A resource specification specifies something that has a 
name, may have reasonable representations and that can 
owned. The ownership of a resource is connected with the 
right to set policy on the resource.  
PlanReseourceSpecification 
(design-time) 
This is a specification of resources that are used in the Plan 
Specification.  
PrivateResourceSpecification 
(design-time) 
This is a specification of those resources that are only visible 
and available to the individual agent.  
RelocateAction (run-time) An agent can relocate to another location based on 
information contained in the interaction log and agent-
location if an interaction gives access to resources when it 
shouldn’t.  
RelocationActionSpecification 
(design-time) 
Relocation action specification is a specification of how an 
agent can move to another location based on information 
contained in the interaction log and agent-location if an 
interaction gives access to resources when it shouldn’t.  
 
 
 
 
